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SPILL-OVER REPUTATION: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
INDIA & THE UNITED STATES
Srividhya Ragavan1

INTRODUCTION
Spill-over reputation is the concept wherein the fame or
reputation of a trademark in one jurisdiction spills into a second
jurisdiction and gives rise to the issue of protectability in the second
jurisdiction. For example, Starbucks is a famous trademark in the
United States. The mark is also well-known in other jurisdictions.
Let us assume that Starbucks Corporation operates no stores in Utopia
nor is the mark registered there. Thus, Starbucks, as a mark, has no
presence in Utopia. Soon, a local Utopian opens a store under the
name Starbucks to sell star-shaped candies. Starbucks Corporation
objects to the same on the grounds that many Utopians associate
Starbucks with the American entity. Alternately, there may be
situations where an American traveller to Utopia, sees a locally
famous mark. On return, the American traveller uses that Utopian
mark commercially within the US and registers it for under the
Lanham Act. This action prevents the owner of the well-known
Utopian mark from expanding into the US market although the mark
maybe known to American travellers to Utopia. Protection for and
recognition of such marks involve national legal question that have
international implications.
Basic principles of trademark law dictate that the first to use
a trademark in commerce has priority to trademark rights. This is
termed as the “priority rule.” Still, trademarks law, like other areas of
intellectual property law is territorial in nature.2 That is, the right to
1 The author is a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of Law.
Ragavan sincerely acknowledges and thanks Ms. Latha R Nair of K&S Partners, New Delhi,
India for providing details about the relevant Indian cases on the subject of trans-border
reputation, though all opinions expressed regarding Indian case law and the legal position in
this paper are that of the author alone.
2 See James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451, 454–55 (2009) (discussing the
territorial nature of trademarks law).
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the mark is limited to the territory in which the mark is either used or
registered in, as the case is. In all, priority to the rights in the mark is
limited to the defined geographic area of use (territory of use) of the
mark under the territoriality principle.3 The geographic limits on a
trademark have always been tied to the use of the mark in the
territory, especially when the mark is unregistered. Basically, when
a mark is registered, it confers the right to use the mark in the territory
of the country in which it is registered.
The territoriality doctrine essentially means that trademark
rights are national in nature; that is trademark rights of an owner exist
within the national boundaries of each country and are subject to
national laws unless an international application, as required, has
been filed. Thus, the right to a trademark registered within the United
States does not extend beyond the borders of the United States. By
corollary, it means that a third party can rightfully use a name or logo
registered within the US in a third country. Thus, Panera Bread can
be registered in the US by Owner A; in Brazil, the same name can be
registered by a third party for the same or similar products assuming
Owner A has not first registered it in Brazil. The issue with the
territoriality doctrine arises with marks whose reputation is global.
Taking the McDonalds example, the mark has global reputation and
brand identity even in countries where it does not have a registered
presence. Under these circumstances, what happens if a casual
tourist, Tourist A—who visits the United States decides to use the
name in his home country—say, Timbaktu, where the name is not
registered, but may be well-known.
Typically, if Tourist A is the first to register the name in
Timbaktu, then he will have the rights to it within Timbaktu by virtue
of the priority doctrine, but, this result may not be fair for globally
well-known marks such as Coco-Cola, McDonalds, Apple and such
others. For such marks, the question of whether priority of local use
becomes irrelevant if there is territorial reputation is an important
question by creating a famous foreign mark exception to territoriality.
This paper compares India’s position with that of the US on
the question of protection of well-known marks in the light of
applicable international legal prescriptions. The discussion in this
paper compares protection for famous foreign marks (as opposed to

3

Id.
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a famous mark). Famous foreign marks are those that have acquired
fame in one country and hence, well-known in another country.4
Thus, Part I of this paper discusses international prescriptions relating
to the protection in one jurisdiction of a trademark which is
considered well-known in another under the former’s national
trademark law. Part II outlines the Indian position and precedents
relating to well-known trademarks while Part III outlines the
governing Lanham Act provisions and the judicial posture on foreign
trademarks in the United States. The conclusion highlights the
presence of a disconnect between the position of the United States
vis-à-vis other countries on the subject and its local posture on the
question of protection of well-known trademarks.
Part I
The International Prescriptions
This part sets the tone to fully comprehend the competing
principles and doctrines that apply under the international intellectual
property regime when a trademark that has achieved fame in one
jurisdiction is sought to be used by a third party in another part of the
world.
Typically, protection for trademarks are extended territorially
in each country to marks that are either used or registered within the
territory. With globalization, trademarks become well-known and
4

International conventions such as the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement
defines protection for well-known marks. These are marks which enjoys a trans-border
reputation in a jurisdiction in which the product or service is not market. See Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised at the Stockholm Revision
Conference, art. 6(bis), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; see also TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 15, Apr. 15, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27trips.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4UR-RT9Q] [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Famous marks
are those that enjoy a wide-recognition even within a jurisdiction such that its reputation and
its distinctiveness to function as a source identifier is stronger than a typically registered
mark. Within the United States, famous marks are protected as part of Trademarks Dilution
Act, 2006. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120
Stat. 1730; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).The distinction being that famous marks enjoy a
higher level of protection within the United States but these are marks that have acquired
fame within the US. Thus, the famous marks of United States are not necessarily the wellknown marks, which has spill-over reputation from use in another jurisdiction. The
discussion in this paper is about famous foreign marks which are marks that have acquired
fame in one country and hence, well-known in another country.
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gain fame even in jurisdictions where goods or services that bear the
mark are not marketed.5 Under these circumstances, the question is
whether, and should, trademarks well-known in one jurisdiction be
entitled to protection to prevent third parties from appropriating the
fame of the mark by capitalizing on the lack of territorial protection
in a different jurisdiction. The fame of well-known marks has
challenged the traditional notions within which we couch trademarks
law, namely, that protection is extended territorially to protect market
integrity.6
Two important international treaties outline the legal
protection of well-known marks at a multilateral level. These treaties
recognize the importance of protection of trademarks whose fame
goes beyond the territory of the mark’s use and registration.
a)

Paris Convention

The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, 1883 (“Paris Convention”), as amended, addresses the use
of well-known marks under Article 6 (bis).7 Under this Article,
member states can legislatively provide for interested parties to reject,
cancel the registration, or prohibit the use of trademarks which are
confusingly similar to a well-known mark.8 The Convention has no
specific definition of a well-known trademark except that the Article
indicates that it may constitute:
5 Clark W. Lackert & Maren C. Perry, Protecting Well-known and Famous Marks: A
Global Perspective, BUILDING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUE 2008 (King
& Spalding 2008), http://www.buildingipvalue.com/08_global/63-66kingspalding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U649-JRJN].
6 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006),
which outlines protection of famous marks. Under this statute, marks are considered famous
if they fulfill number of statutorily established factors. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for the
definition of fame. Factors such as distinctiveness of the mark, the duration and extent of use
of the mark, the duration and extent of publicity of the mark, the geographical trading area
in which the mark is used, the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used, the degree of recognition of the mark, channels of trade, the nature and extent
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties, registration status of the mark are
examples of factors that are considered towards determining whether a mark is famous under
Title 15 in the United States. Allan P. Hillman, Trademark Dilution: The Fame Game, THE
CONN. L. TRIB. (Dec. 2006), https://shipmangoodwin.com/files/Publication/9b084099-2c374ff1-a1d4-03552f7c019f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d2b31cfe-f91b-4664-8ca407fc18de3b50/trademark_dilution.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4RQ-GGA7].
7 Paris Convention, art. 6.
8 Id.
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“a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well-known in that country as being already
the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention and used for identical or similar goods.”
9

The standard under the Paris Convention seems to be that the
mark, already in use in a third country, should be well-known in the
country of registration such that a strong likelihood of confusion
would result if the mark were to be registered in the third country for
use over identical or similar products. Paris Convention did not
elaborate or define the extent of fame required for a mark to be wellknown nor does it outline any limits or criterion to determine when a
mark can be considered well-known.10 Thus, the question of how
much fame is required for a mark to be well-known was never
addressed under the Convention and was thus presumably left to
every sovereign member state to determine the outer limits of fame.
Further, the use of the terms “identical or similar goods” limited the
scope of protection of the well-known marks doctrine to goods under
the Paris Convention.11 It left service marks uncovered.
b)

TRIPS Agreement

When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
established,12 Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
9 Id. See also Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, The Mgmt.
Of Internet Names And Addresses: Intell. Prop. Issues (Apr. 30, 1999),
https://archive.icann.org/en/wipo/FinalReport_4.html
[https://perma.cc/X8E2-SPPE]
(discussing the special protections needed for famous foreign marks nd well-known marks).
10 Stylianos Malliaris, Protecting Famous Trademarks: Comparative Analysis of US
and EU Diverging Approaches—The Battle Between Legislatures and the Judiciary: Who
Is the Ultimate Judge? 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 48, 50 (2010).
11 Id. Separately, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has been
working towards establishing a treaty addressing protection of well-known and famous
foreign trademarks. Thus, a Standing Committee was established to deal with issues such as
determining when a mark becomes well-known. See World Intellectual Property
Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs And
Geographical Indications, First Session (1998),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_1/sct_1_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C47M-QQ4L]
[hereinafter Standing Committee].
12 Id.
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of Intellectual Property Rights (“the TRIPs Agreement”)
incorporated all substantive provisions of the Paris Convention.13 In
turn, protection of trademark rights under the Paris Convention was
extended to all WTO member-states. Article 16(2) of the TRIPs
Agreement addressed well-known trademarks.14 In general, Article
16 of TRIPs made important changes to the protection regime for
well-known marks. First, the TRIPs Agreement vested the
mandatory obligation on member states to statutorily provide for
owners of a registered trademark the exclusive right to prevent the
use by unauthorized third parties from using “identical or similar”
marks over “goods or services” in a manner resulting in likelihood of
confusion with a registered trademark.15 Thus, the TRIPs Agreement
specifically included service marks, which was originally not
included under the Paris Convention.16 That is, Article 16 of the
TRIPs Agreement specifically elaborates that “Article 6bis of the
Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to services.”17
Second, Article 16(2) of the TRIPs Agreement lists factors that a
member state may consider to determine whether a mark is “wellknown.”18 Such factors include knowledge of the trademark of one
member in the relevant sector of the public, as a result of the
promotion of the trademark, in another member state.19 The Article
specifies that use of the mark within the territory is not considered as
a pre-requisite of knowledge of the mark although it indicates
“promotion of the mark” within the territory is required.20 Third,
Article 16(3) expanded the scope of application of well-known marks
to goods or services that are not similar to those in respect of which a
trademark is registered, provided that: (i) the goods or services over
which the trademark is applied need not be identical or related; and
(ii) there is no need for proof of likelihood of public confusion.21 That
13

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 1C.
Id. art. 16.
15 See id. art. 16(2) (stating that “[I]n determining whether a trademark is well-known,
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the
public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result
of the promotion of the trademark.”).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. art. 16(3).
14
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is, even when there is no confusion (the test to prove infringement),
a well-known mark from one jurisdiction cannot be used by another
party in a second jurisdiction if a connection may be established by
the public. Thus, the use of a well-known trademark on a good or
service can be construed as being violated under two circumstances:
a) the use falsely indicates a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the registered trademark, and b) could likely
damage the interests of the owner of the registered trademark.22 Note
that trademarks enjoyed a broader protection when law embraced the
likelihood of confusion standard, as opposed to actual confusion. The
need for a mere showing of a connection with goods and services of
a well-known mark further broadens the scope of protection of wellknown marks.23 This broadened scope is applied over goods or
services that are not similar, representing a change from the original
standard for the use of a mark over “identical or similar” goods to a
standard that was further broadened to cover “related goods.” In all,
the TRIPs Agreement in mandating member states to recognize wellknown marks on goods and services, broadened the scope of
protection of well-known marks.
Further, with a view to provide clarity on what constitutes a
well-known trademark, Article 16 of the TRIPs Agreement notes that
members shall take into account the knowledge of the trademark “in
the relevant sector of the public,” including the knowledge obtained
within the country as a result of the promotion of the trademark.24 In
not defining what the “relevant public is” this requirement includes
an element of flexibility and subjectivity in determining what
constitutes the “relevant public” and whether the “relevant public”
had knowledge of the mark from the promotion of the mark, which
presumably refers to advertisements and seems to specifically
exclude the need for use or registration of the mark in that market.25
Given the inherent subjectivity outlined in Article 16, ultimately, the
determination of whether a trademark used or registered in one
jurisdiction can be considered well-known in another is based on
national legislations and interpretations of what would constitute
knowledge of the relevant public. Additionally, Article 16(2)
provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances for a competent
22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 16(2).
Id.
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national authority to define “the relevant public” to ultimately
determine whether a contested mark is well-known.
The recommendation for member states from the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with reference to the term
“relevant sectors of the public” is that it is broad enough to include
actual and/or potential consumers, members involved in the channels
of distribution and business people involved in the type of goods
and/or services to which the mark applies.26 It is recommended that
even if the mark is determined to be well-known in at least one
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be
considered by the Member State to be a well-known mark.27 That is,
a Member State may determine that a mark is a well-known mark,
even if the mark is not otherwise considered to be so known. The
WIPO recommendations form a part of the non-binding Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks of WIPO which is meant to help member countries
determine factors to protect well-known marks.28
The
recommendations also define non-exhaustive recommendatory
factors to determine when a mark can be considered well-known.29
The international prescriptions underscore the importance of
having clear national laws to protect well-known marks of the
subject. The use of “acquired fame” to determine whether a mark is
well-known has minimized, although not eliminated, the role of use
within the jurisdiction as an important indicator to prove fame. While
26 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (Sept. 1999),
https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=346 [https://perma.cc/M566-3YBH];
see also Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known
Marks, General Report of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, 34th Annual
Meeting, Doc. A/34/16 ¶¶ 171–83 (Sept. 1999).
27 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, art. 2(2)(b) (Sept. 1999).
28 Id. art. 2.
29 Id. Under the WIPO Guidelines, a mark may be considered to be wellknown/famous, if one or more of the considerations listed below applies. Such
considerations include: a) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant
sector of the public; b) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark; c)
the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, d) advertising or
publicity and the presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which
the mark applies; e) the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or any
applications for registration of the mark, f) the record of successful and enforcement of rights
in the mark; g) the extent to which competent authorities recognize the mark and the value
associated with the mark. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
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protection is mandated, there is adequate inbuilt flexibility for
national laws to determine the scope of protection for marks from one
jurisdiction to qualify for protection in a second jurisdiction based on
spill-over reputation. Thus, harmonization notwithstanding, there is
rightly, a level of variance in national laws and interpretations that
can lead to different conclusions.
Part II
Treatment of Spill-over reputation in India
In January 1995, India joined the WTO.30 The graduation into
a WTO member necessitated amendments to India’s intellectual
property laws including the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958,31
to comply with India’s obligations under the TRIPs Agreement.32
Thus, a new Trade Marks Act was enacted in 1999 and entered into
force in 2003.33 The amended statute harmonized India’s trademarks
statute with the TRIPs Agreement. The discussion in this section is
confined to the requirement of granting protection to well-known
foreign trademarks and how India has been dealing with issues arising
therefrom.
a)

Historic Judicial Precedent: Abandonment v. trans-border
reputation

Modelled along the lines of the British statute on trademarks,
the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act of 1958 had no specific
provision addressing the protection of reputation enjoyed by a mark

30 India and the WTO, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/XBS36DA6] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
31 The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1958
(India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1005493/
[https://perma.cc/TLB8-8CTN] [hereinafter, TMM].
32
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4 (requiring certain protections for intellectual
property rights).
33 See Trade Marks Act, 1999, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India)
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128107 [https://perma.cc/6RV7-CM6S]
(consolidating trademark law and providing for the protection of trademarks); see also Trade
Marks Act, 1999 Comes Into Force, THE HINDU (Sept. 16, 2003),
https://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/16/stories/2003091605991500.htm
[https://perma.cc/WP6H-LKGY] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).
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within India if the mark was not used or registered in India.34 That
said, section 27(2) preserved common law rights of passing off with
respect to unregistered trademarks, which could be used to fashion
protection for such marks.35 Considering that the reputation and
goodwill enjoyed by a mark is a pre-requisite for any passing-off
action,36 Indian courts dealt with trans-border reputation under
Section 27(2) of the 1958 legislation.
Remarkably, in one of the earlier judgments rendered in
Centron Industrial Alliance Limited & Another v. Gillette UK
Limited,37 in 1986, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dealt
with an allegation by Gillette, the plaintiff-respondent, that Centron
Industrial Alliance Limited and Everkeen Blade Co. infringed its
trademark on 7O’Clock with respect to safety razor blades.38 Import
of the 7O’CLOCK razors to India were not permissible post 1958 due
to restrictions imposed by the Government of India.39 Thus, there
was a period when the blades were not sold in India by Gillette.
However, in 1984, Gillette entered into a collaboration agreement
with an Indian company for manufacture and sale of the razors in
India. In 1985, Gillette was notified about an allegedly infringing use
by the defendants of the mark “7-Up” on safety razors (placed along
with a clock face with the hands at “7”, which was similar to Gillette’s
mark). The defendants asserted that that Gillette’s mark 7O’CLOCK
was not used in India on or after 1958 and that whatever reputation
and goodwill that existed with respect to any goods thereof must be
deemed to have been lost by the time the defendants’ razors were put
in the market.40
The Court noted that blades were advertised in foreign
newspapers and magazines extensively and these were circulated in
India through importation.41 Additionally, the Court considered the
34

See TMM, supra note 31 (limiting applicability to India).
Id. § 27(2) which states “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action
against any person for passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in
respect thereof.”
36 Id.
37
Unreported case. Decided on July 24, 1986 by the Bombay High Court in Appeal
No. 368 of 1986 by Justices S. K. Desai & S.P. Bharucha, available at
www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117eb32713e179478af29e# [https://perma.cc/GUR653RH].
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. ¶ 7.
35
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fact that a large number of Indians travel out temporarily to other
countries and would have had the opportunity to use Gillette’s
7O’CLOCK branded razors and issued an injunction against the
defendants. The defendants raised the issue abandonment on the
ground that Gillette had either no goodwill in the mark 7O’CLOCK
because of non-use in India from 1958, or, that goodwill had been
exhausted from the date of non-use,42 The court, however, opined that
the mark had not lost its distinctiveness in India on the grounds that:
“It is not possible for us at this stage at least to accept
the submission that there was no user at all in India or
not sufficient user as to amount to destruction or
abandonment of the plaintiffs’ goodwill and
reputation. It is now equally not possible to accept the
submission that the goods of the plaintiffs had lost
their distinctiveness and had ceased to be associated
in the minds of possible consumers with the goods of
the plaintiffs on account of the policies of the
Government of India as a result whereof the
commercial user in India had become restricted.”43
Typically, abandonment is an important part of trademarks
jurisprudence.44 The Indian court seems to have considered several
factors but not whether abandonment by non-use results in loss of
rights within India. Nor did it try to define when a mark may be
considered abandoned. Instead, the Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court in yet another occasion held in favor of Gillette regarding
the very same mark in the 1987 in Kamal Trading Co. & Ors v.
Gillette UK Limited.45 While the case involved the mark 7
O’CLOCK, the distinguishing feature was that the mark was adopted
Id. ¶ 6. “Plaintiffs had no goodwill in mark ‘7 O’CLOCK’ as the goods manufactured
by the plaintiffs are not available in India since 1958 and the goodwill, even if any, stood
extinguished, while, on the other hand, the defendants acquired goodwill in respect of the
mark “7 O’CLOCK” from 1982.” See e.g., Emergency One, Inc v. American Fireeagle, Ltd.,
228 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing principles involved in abandonment because of
non-use in the United States).
43 Id. at ¶ 5.
44 See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (stating a trademark is deemed abandoned if “its use has been
discontinued with intent not to resume such use . . . Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be
prima facie evidence of abandonment. “ “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such
mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in mark”).
45 Kamal Trading Co. and Ors. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., (1988) 8 PTC 1 (Del).
42
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over dissimilar goods, namely, toothbrushes. Further, the defendant
relied on a decision relating to abandonment from the English Courts
in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar N P (“Budweiser
case”)46 where the Court of Appeals in England considered that the
plaintiff’s sale of Budweiser beer to military and diplomatic
establishments in England (around 5 million cans) as “sporadic and
occasional sales.” Deeming these as not amounting to carrying on
business in England, plaintiff was refused an injunction against the
defendant’s use of the same mark. In India, rejecting the holding of
the said decision, the Division Bench held as follows:47
“ . . . it is not possible to conclude that the goodwill or
the reputation stands extinguished merely because the
goods are not available in the country for some
duration. . . . It is possible that the manufacturers
may suspend their business activities in a country for
short duration, but that fact would not destroy the
reputation or goodwill acquired by the
manufacturers.”48
While the decision rightly asserted that “goodwill is not
limited to a particular country” on account of global sales and trade,
perhaps the court could have considered the jurisprudence on
abandonment of a mark. The decision broadened the goodwill
concept to countries where the goods not available but are
presumably known not because they were widely advertised with
intent to use within the county but because there were general
advertisements newspapers, periodicals, magazines abroad meant for
that market.49 The two Gillette decisions’ failure in not drawing a
clear jurisprudential boundary of when goodwill begins and ends set
the tone for many of the subsequent cases. Unfortunately, the
holdings of these judgment became an important precedent in India.
Five years later, in 1996, the Supreme Court of India had the
occasion to decide the issue of trans-border reputation in N R Dongre

46
47
48
49

Anheuser-Busch v. Budejovicky Budvar, (1984) F.S.R. 413, 4 IPR 260 (India).
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
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& Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation.50 The trademark in issue,
Whirlpool, was registered under the Indian Trademarks Act, 1958.51
The trademark was used in respect of electrical goods including
washing machines and owned by Whirlpool Corporation USA.
While the mark was registered on February 22, 1956 in classes 7, 9
& 11, the registrations were not renewed after 1977 due to a lapse in
protection.52 However, despite the lapse in registration, the
Whirlpool mark was being used in India through sale of washing
machines to the offices of the US Embassy and USAID offices in
New Delhi.53 Whirlpool had also advertised its products in various
publications having circulation in India.54 Furthermore, goods
bearing the Whirlpool mark were reaching Indian consumers either
as second-hand products or through indirect channels.55 The
defendant, an Indian company, applied in 1986 to register the mark
Whirlpool for the same class of goods and that application was
granted.56
The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on the reputation of
the Whirlpool mark in India. The court cited the Delhi High Court’s
position that, “[E]ven advertisement of trade mark without existence
of goods in the market is also to be considered as use of the trade
mark.”57 It is also not necessary however that the association of the
plaintiff’s marks with his goods should be known all over the country
or to every person in the area where it is known best.” 58 Citing
Faulder & Co. Ltd. v. O & G. Rushton,59 the court held that the facts
prima facie demonstrate that the respondent was prior user of the
50 N.R. Dongre and Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr, (1996) 16 PTC 583 (Del),
available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1732339/ [https://perma.cc/NL6Z-PL2D]
[hereinafter Whirlpool, SC of India).
51 N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., AIR 1995 Delhi 300, 302–304 (India) [hereinafter
Division Bench decision].
52 Id. ¶ 3.
53 Id. ¶ 11.
54 Id.
55
Id. ¶ 3.
56 Whirlpool Corporation filed an opposition which was rejected, and the trademark
was registered in the defendants’ name. When the appeal came before the Supreme Court,
Whirlpool Corporation’s petition for expunging the registration granted to the defendant was
pending before the Trade Marks Office. See Whirlpool, SC of India.
57 N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., AIR 1995 Delhi 300, 304 (India).
58 Id.
59 Faulder & Co., Ld. v. O. & G. Rushton, Ld, (1903) 20 RPC 477 (India).
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trade mark “WHIRLPOOL” as it was using the same since 1941,
while the appellants themselves claim the adoption thereof from 1986
and only within India.60 Thus, the court held that the trade mark
“WHIRLPOOL” has acquired reputation and goodwill in this country
and the same has become associated in the minds of the public or
potential buyers with the goods.61
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of India did not address
whether not renewing registration for ten years after its expiry
amounts to abandonment. If the trademark owner did not protect his
rights within the territory by continuously renewing the registration,
then it is unclear why the court felt the need to be sympathetic to a
careless trademark owner. Nevertheless, the case is commendable
established and reiterated the international standard protection of
trademark rights need not be based on use within the territory. Yet,
the court could have perhaps delved into the issue of whether a mark
that has been intentionally abandoned for ten years can be considered
by a jurisdiction to have enough accumulated goodwill such that the
foreign mark owner can take over the goodwill of a territorially
registered user. The judgment, arguably, highly diluted the value of
trademark registration and associations with the territorially doctrine.
b) Indian Judiciary sets a trend in favoring foreign marks
The decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the Whirlpool
decision started a trend that seemed to favor foreign trademark
owners. It seemed like the High Courts involved and even the
Supreme Court did not venture into the question of establishing the
threshold or criterion to fully determine the limits of fame. Nor was
there any criterion established to distinguish between a use that will
distinguish a known trademark from a well-known trademark,
sufficient to qualify as locally well-known or “famous.” While the
Whirlpool decision is widely regarded as an attempt to appease the
United States, the Whirlpool case also became an important precedent
setting the trend for further expansion of the scope of the recognition
for trans-border reputation as elaborated below.62 The holding of the
60

Whirlpool, SC of India.
Id.
62 Nicky Jatana, Did Whirlpool Make Its Mark in India—N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool
Corp., 10 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 331, 334 (1997),
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol10/iss2/7/ [https://perma.cc/5KSR-N33Q].
61

346

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 14

Whirlpool case on trans-border reputation was followed in several of
the subsequent cases decided under the trademarks statute. The
decision is perhaps an example of how the judiciary, in seeming good
faith, but without larger economic justification, has interpreted the
statute more broadly to accommodate to global trends.
In line with the precedent that goodwill will be protected even
if the mark is not used within India, in 1991, a single Judge of the
Delhi High Court decided a dispute involving Apple Computer Inc.
v. Apple Leasing and Industries.63 This dispute was brought before
the court by Apple Computers Inc., (“Apple”), United States, against
an Indian company. During that time, Apple had been exporting its
computers to India since 1977, although primarily to departments of
the Indian Government. At that time, Apple had pending trademark
applications in India for the mark, logo and the mark APPLE
CENTRE, and hence, the question related to passing-off of a
reputable foreign mark. Apple sued an Indian entity which chose to
call itself, “Apple Computer Education” and made use of a partly
bitten apple which called to mind the Apple logo. In its defense, the
Indian company argued that goodwill alone was not protectable under
a passing-off action and that the foreign owner is required to conduct
its business in India.64 Rejecting the argument, the Delhi High Court
held that in the context of the present day circumstances involving
the free exchange of information through several media and
considering the freedom and ability to travel globally a plaintiff
cannot be expected to carry on business in a jurisdiction before
improper use of its name or mark can be restrained by the court.65
Despite the Indian statute being modelled on English law, the court
was persuaded by opinions on passing-off from other jurisdictions
such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada to hold that the plaintiff
had a prima facie case against the defendants from using the words
“Apple” or “Apple Computers” in the course of the trade of computer
education.66 In doing so, although much of the judgment discusses
confusion rather than dilution of a well-known mark, this court
established that use or conducting business within India was not
required in order to protect goodwill within India, which comports
with the international requirements.
63
64
65
66

Apple Computer Inc. v. Apple Leasing and Industries, (1991) 1 ALR 93 (India).
Id.
Id. ¶ 159.
Id. ¶ 160.
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Similarly, in the 1997 Division Bench decision of the Bombay
High Court, in Aktiebolaget Volvo of Sweden v. Volvo Steels Ltd. Of
Gujarat (India)67 noted that trans-border reputation was recognized
by Indian Courts and that as a matter of law, it was not necessary to
prove actual sale if the plaintiff was able to prove goodwill and
reputation of the mark in India. The plaintiff in that case, a Swedish
automobile company, who had no business in India at that time, was
suing a local defendant for unauthorized adoption and use of its
Volvo mark in respect of mild steel ingots.68 Later, in 2001, a Single
Judge of the Delhi High Court held in Rainforest Café Inc v.
Rainforest Café and Ors69 that, although the American corporation,
Rainforest Café Inc, had no business activity in India, the fact that it
had received several trade inquiries from India was sufficient to issue
an injunction against a local defendant who adopted the identical
mark ‘Rainforest Café: A Wild Place to Eat’ for his restaurant. The
Court found that, failure to do so would cause irreparable injury to
the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff worldwide besides having
adverse ramifications on the impending franchise enquiries for New
Delhi and other parts of India.70 In 2002, another Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court cited the Whirlpool case and held in favor of the
American cosmetic company, Jolen Inc, which had no business
activity in India at that time, by restraining a local defendant who
adopted an identical mark and get up for identical goods.71
The judicial trend in favor of trans-border reputation in some
ways has resulted in courts not delving into the different legal and
economics questions that are integral to appreciate the threshold and
limitations of goodwill being spilled-over. Is there not a difference
between the goodwill enjoyed in a foreign country of the Apple mark
on the one hand and other marks such as Rainforest Café and Jolen,
on the other? Importantly, marks such as Jolen may not cross the
threshold of fame within the US. Even if Jolen and Rainforest Café
are considered as famous marks in the US, is the fame not different
in a country like India where these products are predominantly known
67

Aktiebolaget Volvo of Sweden v. Volvo Steels Ltd. Of Gujarat, (1998) 18 PTC 47

(Bom).
68

Id.
Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., (2001) 91 DLT 508 (India);
Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., 2001 (21) PTC 353 (Del).
70 Id.
71 Jolen Inc. v. Doctor & Company, (2002) 24 PTC 29 (Del).
69
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to smaller market of people. Do the courts not have an obligation to
consider how a “market” should defined in order to determine fame
and goodwill?
c) Lost opportunity to underscore the doctrinal split between
territoriality & fame
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court dealt with a case that
indirectly highlighted the intersection of the famous (foreign) marks
doctrine with the territoriality requirement. In Milmet Oftho
Industries & Ors v. Allergan Inc,72 the Supreme Court rejected an
appeal from a local defendant who adopted an identical mark
OCUFLOX for a medicinal preparation. In doing so, it held that the
mere fact that the plaintiff had not been using the mark in India would
be irrelevant if they were the first in the world market. However, the
Supreme Court added a note of caution as follows:
“Multinational corporations, who have no intention of
coming to India or introducing their product in India
should not be allowed to throttle an Indian Company
by not permitting it to sell a product in India, if the
Indian Company has genuinely adopted the mark and
developed the product and is first in the market. Thus
the ultimate test should be who is first in the
market.”73
Despite the note of caution, the court felt that because medical
practitioners regularly travel abroad and because these goods are
widely advertised, a product is likely to acquire a worldwide
reputation. It would have been nice to see the court delve into what
constitutes a market for determining goodwill. Is it the general public
or the doctors or the smaller percentage of doctors who travel abroad
or the pharmacists who dispense these medications?
That said, this case also captured succinctly the conflict
between determining fame in the context of the territoriality doctrine
when dealing with famous foreign trademarks. For the first time, the
Court indicated that priority of innocent use within India would and
could supersede trans-border reputation. This would be the
72
73

Milmet Oftho Industries and Ors. Vs. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
Id.
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traditional approach wherein even though the mark may be used
aboard successfully, a prior-user in India who used it in good faith
should be capable of holding onto the mark successfully. Otherwise,
it subjects local users unfairly to foreign corporations and their brand
investments.74
d) Post-TRIPS statutory changes and its impact on famous foreign
trademarks
Under the 1999 Trade Marks Act, (“the TM Act”), which
came into effect in 2003, notes that in order to receive protection
under the statute, read with rules, there is no pre-condition that the
mark is used or registered in India.75 Importantly, the provisions in
the Indian TMA do not insist on use of the well-known mark in
India.76 Section 11(9) of the statute specifically states that the
Registrar shall not deny protection for a well-known mark on the
grounds that the trade mark has not been used in India or that the trade
mark has not been registered in India or that a previous application
for registration of the trade mark has not been filed in India or that
the trade mark is not well-known to the public at large in India.77
Similarly, India does not consider the priority of use within India as
a criterion in determining fame or for the protection of a well-known
foreign mark which seems to be in line with the WIPO joint
recommendations.78 Traditional trademarks law focused on priority
of use within the territory.
Given the strong territoriality
considerations of traditional trademarks law for a prior local user, the
question of whether famous foreign marks which represent prior
74

Id.
Trade Marks Act, 1999, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India) available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128107 [https://perma.cc/8SMW-H6YN]
[hereinafter, TMA 1999]. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (stating that, “In determining
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all
relevant factors, including . . . .(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March
3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register”).
76
TMA 1999, § 11(8); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (requiring that the
trademark owner must show valid ownership of the famous mark as well as commercial use
in commerce of the mark that allegedly causes dilution of the famous mark. This law does
not require the mark to be registered in the United States in order to receive famous mark
protection, but it should be used in the United States).
77 TMA 1999, §11(9).
78 See generally The Problem of Notoriety: Famous and Well-Known Marks, in FINAL
REPORTS OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES PROCESS (1999).
75
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foreign users, form an exception territoriality doctrine has not been
fully expounded and may be left to the courts to consider. That is,
should a prior foreign user of a mark famous in that jurisdiction be
given priority against a first local user of the mark?
Similarly, section 11(6) thereof lays down non-exhaustive
criteria for determining a well-known mark.79 Such criteria include
knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant section of the
public including knowledge in India obtained as a result of promotion
of the mark, duration, extent and geographical area of use and
promotion of the mark, duration and geographical extent of the
registration of the mark and instances of successful enforcement of
the rights in that trade mark.80 Further, the Registrar shall also
consider the market for the goods, channels of distribution and “the
business circles dealing with the goods or services, to which that trade
mark applies.”81 Thus, since the public at large need not know of a
well-known mark, it is left to the judiciary to narrow what constitutes
“relevant public” to determine the extent of fame of the mark.
In March 2017, India unveiled a new Trademarks Rules. Rule
82
124 allows parties to request the Registrar to determine a trademark
as well-known by filing a relevant form along with a statement of
case by including all the evidence and documents relied by the
applicant in support of his claim.83 However, the Registrar also has
the power to change that status if circumstances change after
providing due opportunity of hearing to the concerned party.84
Notably, the Registrar can request additional documents85 and invite
oppositions/objections from the general public.86 If the Registrar
79

TMA 1999, § 11(6).
Id.
81 Id. § 11(7)(3).
82 See Trademark Rules, 2017, Gzaette of India, pt. II, sec. 4(i) at Rule 124 [hereinafter
TM Rules] (establishing rules for trademark registration).
83 Id. Once the documents are filed, the Registrar will make a determination, based on
such documents and Sections 11(6) to (9) of the TM Act, whether the mark is well-known.
84 Id. at Rule 124(6) (“The Registrar may, at any time, if it is found that a trademark
has been erroneously or inadvertently included or is no longer justified to be in the list of
well-known trademarks, remove the same from the list after providing due opportunity of
hearing to the concerned party.”)
85 Id. “For the purpose of determination, the Registrar may call such documents as he
thinks fit.
86 Id. at Rule 124(4) “Before determining a trademark as well-known, the Registrar
may invite objections from the general public to be filed within thirty days from the date of
invitation of such objection.”
80
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determines that the mark is well-known, the mark will be published
in the trademark Journal and included in the list of well-known
trademarks maintained by the Registrar.87 Under the rules, the Indian
Trade Marks Office maintained a list of well-known marks which
were included based on a request by the owners of the marks provided
they presented valid proof.88 The Trade Marks Office typically
preferred a court order recognizing the mark as a well-known mark
as valid proof of fame of the mark.89 This is comparable to the
Japanese practice of publishing well-known trademarks.90
Under the new Rules, the trademarks Registrar wields
extraordinary powers with reference to either graduating or demoting
a trademark as being well-known. That said, Registrar is required to
take into consideration, Sections 11(6) to 11(9) of the TM Act,
discussed above. It is also arguable that right of third parties to object
and the right to appeal perhaps act as limitations on the power of the
Registrar. Presumably, there may be marks that may qualify as wellknown under Section 11 (6) of the statute but has either not made it
to the well-known marks in the list because adequat4 documentation
was not presented or, because, the Registrar did not think that it would
qualify despite the documentation. The status of these marks may
have to be judicially determined. Arguably, the statute is TRIPS-plus
for the recognition of foreign well-known marks on because it does
not seek promotion of the mark within the territory of India, which is
a part of the WIPO recommendation. Thus, the judicial opinions
under the amended act, discussed below, presents a dichotomy
between territoriality and priority which has been unresolved until
recently.

87 Id. at Rule 124(5) “In case the trademark is determined as well-known, the same shall
be published in the trademark Journal and included in the list of well-known trademarks
maintained by the Registrar.”
88 See TM Rules, supra note 82 (showing on March 6, 2017, the Trade Mark Rules
2017 were notified into effect).
89 See List of Well-known Trademarks, Office of the Controller General of Patents,
Designs & Trademarks, DEPT. OF INDUSTRIAL POL’Y & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, GOVT. OF INDIA (JUN. 2017), available at
http://www.ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/Images/pdf/well-known-trademaks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96RD-JNJV] (cataloguing famous and well-known marks).
90 B. Winterfeldt & L. Emmett, Protecting Famous Marks, 56(8) INT’L TRADEMARK
ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2001),
https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/ProtectingFamousMarks.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MS7U-LXVF].
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e) The intersection between the territoriality and famous mark
doctrine
Considering the traditional underpinnings of the territoriality
doctrine which dictates that prior territorial user gets protection, the
question typically is whether a prior foreign user be given priority
against a first local user when dealing with a famous foreign mark?
In 2006, in Austin Nichols and Co. and Seagram India Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. Arvind Behl, Jagatjit Industries Ltd.,91 a Single Judge of the
Delhi High Court considered whether the mark “Blenders Pride” used
in respect of the whisky manufactured by the plaintiff enjoyed transborder reputation. Adopted in 1973, the foreign plaintiff had been
selling the said whisky in over 50 countries worldwide.92 Plaintiff
asserted that Blenders Pride enjoyed trans-border reputation in India
on the grounds that between the late 1980s and early 1990s, millions
of global Indian travelers were exposed to the sale and promotion of
the whisky.93 The plaintiff’s business in India was set up in 1993
through a wholly owned subsidiary. In 2003, ironically the respective
marks of the plaintiff and the defendant, namely, Blenders Pride,
were advertised in the same Trade Marks Journal and both the parties
filed oppositions against each other’s application. The Indian
Trademarks office granted registration to the defendants in 2004. In
2005, the plaintiffs learnt that the defendants had introduced their
whisky in the Indian market and a suit was filed. The defendants
asserted that they were the prior users of the Blenders Pride mark in
India, thus bringing the question of prior user within the jurisdiction
versus reputation outside the territory.94 The defendants claimed that
they were the prior-user within the territory and hence, presumably,
implicated the question of the famous foreign mark exception to
territoriality.
The court cited the Milmet Oftho95 and held that, Blenders
Pride whisky manufactured by the plaintiffs had the worldwide
reputation, being available for sale in a large number of countries
since 1973. The Court added that the plaintiffs were not using their
worldwide reputation to throttle an Indian company by not permitting
91
92
93
94
95

Austin Nichols & Company & Anr v. Arvind Behl & Anr, (2006) 32 PTC 133 (Del).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
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it to sell its product in India; they were only trying to defend their
worldwide reputation in the Blenders Pride whisky.96 Further, the
Court pointed out that even if the plaintiffs were not manufacturing
the said whisky in India, it would be irrelevant.
Similarly, in 2008, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
in Kiran Jogani and Anr. Vs. George V Records, SARL,97 decided
whether the mark BUDDHA-BAR enjoyed trans-border reputation in
India. The respondent-plaintiff owner who first used it as part of a
music album asserted that it was the first to adopt the name and use
it in the year 1996 as the name of a restaurant in Paris.98 Further,
plaintiff asserted that the music albums played at the said restaurant
by well-known Disco Jockeys were compiled into CDs as they
became extremely popular and were then sold under the trade mark
BUDDHA-BAR from the year 1999 onwards.99 The plaintiff also
claimed extensive worldwide registrations for the said mark in classes
9 and 41 and argued that its reputation has spread across the world
and spilled over to India well prior to the adoption of the offending
mark by the appellant-defendant in 2002 in respect of musical
records. 100 The defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to
establish user rights in India and that the first invoice on record dated
February 21, 2002, a date after the release of the defendant’s album
in January, 2002.101 In doing so, this court considered, “[W]hat
would be the best material which the respondent could have produced
to establish its trans-border reputation?”102 In its wisdom, the court
felt that “[I]t is not as if there is a motivated article in one newspaper
or magazine, but the vast coverage given to the restaurant and the
music in international press and the magazines including
transmission of programs through television channels to show even
the participation of Indian designers.”103 Based in this, the Court
found merit in the claims of the plaintiff-appellant and upheld the
trans-border reputation in its mark BUDDHA-BAR.

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Kiran Jogani and Anr. Vs. George V. Records, (2008) 38 PTC 69 (Del).
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Id.
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Similarly, in Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GMBH v.
Premchand,104 decided in 2013, the trademarks in dispute before a
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court were “MUCOSOLVAN” and
“MUCOSOLVIN”, used in respect of their respective cough syrups.
The plaintiff, a German company established in the year 1845, who
had been conducting its business in India through its subsidiary,
claimed that its mark “MUCOSOLVAN” was adopted in 1975 and
that it has been using it continuously since 1979.105 The plaintiff
asserted trans-border reputation in the mark and claimed that it was
the first to adopt and use the said mark anywhere in the world. It had
a pending application in India at the time of filing the suit. 106 The
plaintiff was aggrieved when it learned in 2011 about the defendant’s
use of the mark MUCOSOLVIN for a cough syrup.107 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, being in the same business was aware of
the goodwill and reputation of its trademark MUCOSOLVAN and its
use of the said mark since 1979.108
Resisting the suit, the defendants argued that the plaintiff has
not used its trademark “MUCOSOLVAN” in India till the date of the
suit and that its pending trademark application filed in October, 2011
was on an ‘intention to use’ basis. Rejecting the arguments of the
defendant, the Court considered “other factors” and relied on Milmet
Oftho Industries.109 It noted that Supreme Court observed that the
mere fact that the plaintiff was not using the mark in India would be
irrelevant if they were first in the world market. The court was
enamored and seemingly blinded by the fact that plaintiff held a
registration for the mark MUCOSOLVAN in as many as 93
countries, and that the Plaintiff’s MUCOSOLVAN products are
available worldwide!
Other cases include a 2016 Division Bench decision of the
Delhi High Court decided the issue of trans-border reputation of the
mark, Lavera Mac Personal Care Pvt Ltd & Ors v. Laverana
GMBH.110 ‘LAVERA’ is a Latin word meaning ‘the truth’. The
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

(Del).

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GMBH v. Premchand, (2014) 57 PTC 339 (Del).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Milmet Oftho Industries, (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
Lavera Mac Personal Care Pvt Ltd & Ors v. Laverana GMBH, (2016) 65 PTC 357
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respondent-plaintiff, a German company, had adopted the mark
LAVERA in 1980 for cosmetic products and has been marketing
these products since the year 1982. The plaintiff claims extensive
registrations around the world and a pending registration in India at
the time of filing the suit. It was the plaintiff’s claim that due to such
extensive worldwide use, its products sold under the same mark has
earned goodwill and reputation, that its products are freely available
on e-bay and online stores, that it has country code top level domain
name registrations in various countries. The appellant-defendants on
the other hand, argued that the plaintiff had never used the mark in
India and that they had been using the mark since 2005 although it
was not registered, which made the court believe that the adoption of
the name was dishonest. The defendants claimed that they adopted
the identical mark LAVERA from the aloe vera plant used in beauty
treatment.111 The Single Judge had held in favor of the plaintiff by
noting that the existence of a merchant on a webpage of foreign origin
is sufficient to show the trans-border reputation even if it had no
activity in India at the relevant time. The court felt that the growth of
the internet and the modern means of communication made it
relatively easier to establish international reputation and its spill-over
effects. 112
Overall, the decisions from Indian courts have exhaustively
considered the issue of whether the plaintiff was “prior in use in the
world.” In doing so, India seems to have created a famous foreign
mark exception to the territoriality doctrine. In doing so, other
considerations such as the threshold and limitations of goodwill, the
larger economic considerations, the territoriality doctrine’s protection
for registered trademarks and good-faith deservedly need closer
consideration and scrutiny. Typically, as discussed below using the
United States is an example, prior-users within a country, especially
if they are registered users, will get protection unless the use was
clearly dishonest or of the fame of the mark vastly overweighs such
use. The tension with the territoriality doctrine (that is, protection for
the prior territorial user) has generally resulted in famous foreign
marks not be considered as an exception when a local prior territorial
user is prevalent. Indian judiciary did not get into this question until
the Prius judgment discussed below.
111
112

Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. ¶¶ 1516.
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Part IV
United States & Well-known Trademarks
The following segment outlines how the United States treats
famous foreign marks. The discussion deals with situations wherein
a famous foreign mark, well-known locally in the foreign country, is
used America for the first time within the United States. The segment
examines whether it becomes more complicated if the mark is
registered by the local-user, thus becoming a prior-registered-user of
a famous foreign mark within the US. The question when and if the
original foreign user/owner of the mark wants to use the mark in the
United States, is whether fame abroad should be an exception to
territoriality to establish priority of use.
a)

Intersections of Fame within priority & territoriality

In the United States, as discussed earlier, the first to use a
trademark in commerce has priority to trademark rights under the
“priority rule.” United Drug Co., v. Theodore Rectanus Co.113
discusses the limits of geographic use with reference to unregistered
marks. Two different parties used the same trademark, Rex, in two
different locations for over 25 years. The products over which the
mark was used was different although related, considering that one
used it on medicines to treat dyspepsia and the other used it on blood
purifiers. Since both users had used it for several years, the rule of
priority did not truly help either of the users. Considering this, the
Supreme Court held that geographic limits circumscribed the rule of
priority provided the use was made in good faith. The court outlined
that “where two parties independently are employing the same mark
upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wherein one is
wholly remote from the other, the question of prior appropriation is
legally insignificant, unless at least it appears that the second adopter
has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the
first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to
forestall the extension of his trade, or the like.”114 The court added
113

United Drug Co., v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
See id. at 101; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415
(1916) (establishing the “tea rose” doctrine and stating that prior appropriation is “legally
insignificant” in cases where the marks are used in separate markets).
114
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that the right to a trademark grows out of its use in connection with
an existing business and not by mere adoption.115 Thus, the Supreme
Court established what is now called the Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine.
Essentially, the Tea Rose doctrine states that the first user of
a common law trademark may not oust a later user’s good faith use
of an infringing mark in a market where the first user’s products or
services are not sold.116 Thus, between unregistered users, the
priority of use in that geographic area controlled. Courts have
repeatedly adopted the well-established Supreme Court rationale that
the owner of a common-law mark may not “monopolize markets that
his trade has never reached and where the mark signifies not his goods
but those of another.”117
The same rule may not hold if one of the marks is registered.
Generally, even prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act,
registration conferred nation-wide priority to use the mark. An
unregistered user of a mark was not entitled to exclude a registered
owner of the mark from using it in a territory that would fall within
the zone of “normal expansion of business.” Under the Lanham Act
registration of a mark provides constructive notice within the United
States.118 Such constructive notice provides nationwide protection to
registered marks, regardless of the areas in which the registrant
actually uses the mark.119 The essential priority principles of the TeaRose doctrine apply to all registered trademark owners with one
important modification which provides that the owner of a registered
mark has the right to expand its use into new areas of the territory
unless a prior user had generated sufficient goodwill in that market
prior to registration. Thus, the priority of use within a territory
determined rights within the territory.
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Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at 404.
See National Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area
Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) where the court states that the
Supreme Court established the Tea Rose/Rectanus. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100–01 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
at 415 (1916) (stating that rules of appropriation are laxed when the mark is used in two
different areas).
117 See National Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area
Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Hanover Star Milling, 240
U.S. at 416).
118 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
119 Id. In doing so, it effectively eliminates good faith and lack of knowledge defenses
otherwise available to a subsequent user.
116
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Protecting such well-known marks from abroad should form
an exception to the territoriality doctrine if the famous foreign marks
doctrine is recognized.120 Basically, under the famous marks
doctrine, considering the fame of the foreign mark, the question is
whether the second user adopted the mark in good faith. The United
States, in Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café,121 the first
recognized the famous marks doctrine. “Maison Prunier,” was a Paris
restaurant with a branch in London. When a new restaurant was
opened in New York City with a similar name, the owner sought to
enjoin defendants’ use of the name even though it did not have
operations in New York. The appeals court sustained the ruling of
the trial court.122 The court specifically highlighted the general rule
of territoriality but noted that bad faith use of a famous foreign name
by a second user formed an exception to the territoriality rule. Fame
of the mark became a relevant factor relevant to deciding whether the
second user adopted the mark in good faith use and also justify using
unfair competition principles.123 Thus, in the United States, arguably
using unfair competition principles a mark may be entitled to
protection in a country even if it was neither used nor registered
provided it is well known among consumers in that country and there
is clear proof of lack of bad faith appropriation of the mark. It is
worth adding here that some of these decisions have been based on
state common law rather than under federal Lanham Act.124
b)

Travelling Americans need not know of all marks abroad!

The following narrative examines how courts in the United
States have dealt with cases where a well-known mark in a foreign
country has been subjected to prior registration by a third party within
the US. It is important to appreciate that the federal Trademarks

120

See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:4 (4th ed. 2008) (asserting that the famous marks doctrine is incorporated into United
States domestic law through Lanham Act sections 43(a), 44(b), 44(h)).
121 Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, 159 Misc. 551, 557–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1936).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. See also Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should WellKnown Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection within the United States?, 19 DEPAUL
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008) (discussing cases establishing trademark law).
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Dilution Act defines fame and provides a set of criteria to determine
fame of a mark.125
That is, a well-known foreign mark is registered and used
within the United States by a local person raising the issue of who is
the prior user of the mark. For example, in 1981, Larry Christman, a
U.S. citizen and employee of a sportswear wholesaler, visited a
Person’s Co. retail store in Japan.126 The name Person’s was adopted
in 1977 by Takaya Iwasaki for clothing in his native Japan. Two years
later, Iwasaki formed Person’s Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, to
market and distribute clothing items in retail stores located in
Japan.127 On return, Christman developed designs for his own
“PERSON’S” brand sportswear line based on the Person’s products
he had purchased in Japan.128 By April 1984, Christman not only
supplied clothes bearing the Person’s logo within the United States,
he also registered the name for use on wearing apparel.129
Meanwhile, Person’s became a well-known and highly
respected brand in the Japanese fashion industry.130 When the
Japanese company wanted to sell its products in the United States,
they initiated an action to cancel Christman’s registration. On appeal,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that Christman was
a “good faith” prior user of the mark in the United States even though
it was clear that he had misappropriated a mark in use in a foreign
country. The Federal Circuit adopted the view that copying a mark
in use in a foreign country is not per se an evidence of bad faith unless
125 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv); Lanham Act, § 43(c) also known as the
Trademarks Dilution Revision Act, 2006 (TDRA). Under the TDRA, Under the TDRA,
a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the US as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether
a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant
factors, including the following:
(i)The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii)The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under
the mark.
(iii)The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv)Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February
20, 1905, or on the principal register.
126
127
128
129
130

Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1567.
Id.
Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1567.
Id.
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the foreign mark is famous in the United States at that time the
copying is undertaken and the mark is copied for the purpose of
interfering with the prior user’s planned expansion into the United
States. “Christman’s conduct in appropriating and using the
appellant’s mark in a market where he believed the Japanese
manufacturer did not compete can hardly be considered unscrupulous
commercial conduct.131”
Essentially, use within the territory is the critical component
to establish priority over a mark locally. Thus, the territoriality
principle, especially the way it is defined and applied in the United
States, does not deter third parties to adopt, use and protect within the
United States, trademarks that may be known and protected in
another country. Unlike India, which surprising attributes and deems
travelling Indians possess exceptional knowledge of trademarks, the
United States believes that expecting travelling Americans to know
of marks in several countries seems unfair. Hence, from a national
perspective this seems like a fair determination although it does
condone stealing relatively good marks from other countries under
limited circumstances. But, when considering the international
requirements, the US expectations that a foreign mark owner
interested in the US market has the burden to secure prior registration
of the mark in the United States, as seen from the discussion in Grupo
Gigante below, seems to go against basic national treatment
obligations under Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement because it
indirectly favors nationals against foreigners.132
From an
international perspective, this poses an operational problem with
well-known marks that already enjoy a reputation and identity in
foreign jurisdictions when they permeate into the United States,
although the mark may not be protected in the United States. This is
especially true of marks that may be well known within large pockets
of different immigrant communities but not generally well-known.
c)

Delineating the market to determine fame

If the foreign mark enjoys a clear reputation in the United
States before a local user appropriates the mark, the question is
whether fame or territoriality establishes priority over the mark?
131
132

Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1570.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3.
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Interestingly, under contemporary trademarks law, even when a
foreign mark enjoys a clear reputation within the United States, if it
is not registered locally, the foreign trademark holder may lose
priority over the mark.
The Ninth circuit dealt with a case involving a large and wellknown Mexican grocery chain—Grupo Gigante—which has been
operational in Mexico since 1962 but did not have a presence in the
US.133 The name was appropriated by a Michael Dallo in 1996 to
operate an American chain of grocery stores in a locality where
shoppers were familiar with the Mexican mark. Neither party had
registered the mark federally. Considering that the Mexican mark
was well-known in the US, the question is should the Mexican owner
be entitled to priority within the US based on the fame the mark
acquired from its use in Mexico?
The fame of the Grupo Gigante mark in Mexico and the
knowledge of its mark amongst Mexican consumers in the California
market should typically entitle the mark to protection to the name in
the US.134 The defendants argued that the territoriality principle
required that the mark be used within the United States and that the
prior-US-user was entitled to protection even though he had
essentially adopted the mark in the US with full knowledge of its
fame in Mexico. To its credit, the Ninth circuit recognized the
existence of the famous marks doctrine and how it is juxta positioned
over the territoriality doctrine.135 The court specifically clarified that
§44 of the Lanham Act implements Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention.136 Article 10bis requires member countries “to assure to
nationals of [other member countries] effective protection against
unfair competition.” The Ninth circuit court clarified that section 44
of the Lanham Act implements Article 10(bis) of the Paris
Convention by extending Lanham Act protection to foreign nationals
to the extent necessary to satisfy the United States’ treaty
obligations.137
133

Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1091–1092 (2004).
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1092.
135 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094; See also Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara
Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (1985) (discussing the separation of trademark
rights by country); see generally Zobel, supra note 124 (discussing the circuit confusion on
this area of law).
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 1126; See also Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(bis).
137 Id.; Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1099.
134
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Grupo was also able to establish that its mark and its store was
known (secondary reputation) to residents of the San Diego area.138
The district court specifically found that there was sufficient
secondary meaning for the mark in the San Diego area. Yet, the court
ruled that the presence of secondary meaning, which was the court’s
manner of appreciating the fame of the foreign mark in the United
States, alone in an area where the foreign user wishes to assert
protection is insufficient to overcome the territoriality doctrine. In
addition to secondary meaning, the Ninth circuit required that district
courts must be satisfied, by a “preponderance of the evidence, that a
substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market
is familiar with the foreign mark.”139 The court defined the term
“relevant American market” as the geographic area where the
defendant uses the alleged infringing mark. In making this
determination, the court required that factors such as the intentional
copying of the mark by the defendant, and whether customers of the
American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the foreign
trademark owner should be considered.140 The court held that these
factors may not necessarily be determinative although it held that they
are particularly relevant to bear heavily on the risks of consumer
confusion and fraud, which are the reasons for having a famous-mark
exception to the territoriality doctrine.141
From a global perspective, this decision poses a problem with
marks that already enjoy a reputation and identity in foreign
jurisdictions some of which may permeate within the United States,
although the mark may not be protected in the United States. This is
especially true of marks that may be well known within large pockets
of different immigrant communities but not generally well-known
within the United States. The decision essentially directs foreign
mark owners interested in the US market have to carry the burden of
registering the mark in the United States.
This decision is unlike in India where in its zeal to recognize
foreign marks, courts have repeatedly seemingly narrowed goodwill
to what is recognized by the “travelling Indians” and to internet savvy
Indians, which is a small class of the population of the country.
138
139
140
141

Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 n. 23, 24.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id.
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In reality, the famous marks doctrine has always had a
tumultuous recognition in the US. The discussion in the initial part
of the paper of the 1959 decision in Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 142
from the state court New York is a case to the point. While the Ninth
circuit agreed that famous foreign marks can gain exclusive rights
even in territories where it is not in use, it struggled with defining
how famous or how well-known the foreign mark must be within the
US to get protection. 143
d)

US struggles to create an exception to foreign prior users of
well-known marks within the US

Similarly, despite what it preaches to the rest of the world, the
United States struggles to compromise on the priority principle to
grant recognition to famous foreign marks not used in the territory.
For example, in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento
de Barcelona,144 the court specifically noted that the United States
courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights
that exist only under foreign law. Similarly, in Almacenes Exito S.A.
v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc.,145 the court noted that the famous
marks doctrine had no place in federal law and that it was up to the
Congress to carefully prescribe the bases for federal trademark claims
for famous foreign marks. While other cases like Empresa Cubana
del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,146 opines that federal law embodies
principles of famous marks doctrine under or under 43(a),147 it will
not be a stretch to state that the territoriality principle remains
fundamental to federal trademark law in the United States and that
recognition of a famous foreign marks exception would be wellcemented perhaps only with adequate Congressional action. In gist,
the tendency is to provide rights to the local user who uses the mark
first within the US. This is more so, if the US user has managed to
register the foreign mark first in the US.
142

Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757 (1959).
Id.
144 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617,
628 (4th Cir. 2003) (“United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce
trademark rights that exist only under foreign law”).
145 Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327–328
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
146 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2 nd Cir. 2005).
147 15 U.S.C. §1125.
143

364

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 14

Part IV
A Comparative Perspective: India finally wises up, thanks to Prius!
Given how amenable the India courts have been to recognize
and protect US marks are considered well-known in India, even when
the marks may not qualify as famous within the US, the part
highlights how the United States has treated a trademark from India.
This case is taken as a specific example because the earlier part
demonstrates the significant recognition India has awarded to foreign
trademarks, of which the US trademark owners have been the biggest
beneficiaries. It is worth recalling that India specifically derogated
from the priority and territoriality doctrines to bestow recognition for
foreign trademarks.
a)

How India treats US marks

In 2007, the second circuit in the United States decided a case
that particularly allowed and seemingly even encouraged US citizens
to knowingly misappropriate famous foreign trademarks, with a
reputation in the United States.148 The case in question, being, ITC
Limited v. Punchgini,149 related to the acquisition of the name
Bukhara, which name was internationally used, known and voted one
of the world’s fifty best restaurants by London-based Restaurant
magazine.150 In that dispute, the plaintiff ITC Limited (ITC) was an
Indian corporation, which operated the world famous BUKHARA
restaurant since 1977.151 In 1987, ITC Limited (ITC) obtained a
federal U.S. trademark registration for BUKHARA for restaurant
services but the New York restaurant closed on December 17, 1991,
and on August 28, 1997, ITC cancelled its Chicago franchise. In 1999
the defendants, who had worked either in the New Delhi restaurant
or the New York BUKHARA restaurant, formed a company with the
goal of opening a restaurant in New York and named it the
BUKHARA GRILL. The defendants’ restaurant also mimicked the
logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checkered

148
149
150
151

ITC v. Punchgini INC., 482 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
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customer bibs of the plaintiff’s restaurants.152 ITC sued the
defendants in federal court in New York claiming that defendants’
use of a similar mark for a restaurant in New York constituted
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising in
violation of federal and state law. On appeal, the Second Circuit in
2007 affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant on
ITC’s federal and state trademark infringement claims on the grounds
that the ITC depended on the “famous marks” doctrine, which the
court found was not recognized under current federal trademark
law.153
The second circuit in considering whether ITC had priority
over the mark in the United States, held that “a foreign mark holder
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a
United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for
his own use.”154 The second circuit, citing Grupo Gigante,
emphasized the role of territoriality and limited the protection to
foreign mark holders to rights specified in section 44(b).155 In
refusing to recognize the famous mark doctrine, the court held that
foreign holders must have registered the mark and use it to be entitled
to similar protections. In effect, the second circuit allowed a
defendant who knowingly misappropriated a mark that is
internationally famous on the ground that the United States “does not
recognize the famous marks doctrine.”156
The next section examines why the United States, of all
countries, need to recognize famous foreign trademarks to avoid
looking hypocritical.
b)

India wises-up to follow US reciprocity

Arguably after tending towards recognizing as famous marks
that would not pass the fame threshold within the country where the
mark acquired fame—Rainforest Café, being a great example157—
India finally issued an opinion that considered famous foreign marks
in the context of traditional principles of priority and territoriality.
152

Id. at 144.
Id.
154 Id. at 156.
155 Id. at 159; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
156 See ITC, 482 F.3d at 144.
157 Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., (2001) 91 DLT 508 (India);
Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., 2001 (21) PTC 353 (Del).
153

366

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 14

In the earlier discussion, this paper mentioned the 2004 the
Indian Supreme Court’s cautionary words involving Milmet Oftho
Industries,158 that a foreign corporation should not be permitted to
throttle an Indian company, where adoption of a mark by the Indian
company is genuine and first in the market. In 2017, the Supreme
Court of India considered a case involving an allegation of passing
off action initiated by Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha
(‘Toyota’),159 regarding the mark Prius, which it has been using
extensively abroad for its first commercial hybrid car. The court held
that Toyota had not established goodwill or reputation of its mark in
India as of 2001.160 Ruling in favor of the defendant, M/s Prius Auto
Industries Ltd. (‘Prius Auto’), a local Indian company, the court
based its decision on the principle of territoriality of trademarks.161 It
is notable that in 1997 and thereafter, Toyota launched the Prius in
different global markets although the car was first launched in India
only in 2010.162 Until 2009 Toyota had not filed for registration of
the ‘PRIUS’ mark in India. The defendant, Prius Auto, on the other
hand, justified its adoption of the mark PRIUS on the ground that it
was the first in India to manufacture add-on chrome plated
accessories in India. The defendant had obtained registration of the
said mark in the year 2002 and had been continuously using the same
since the year 2001. Prius Auto, therefore, contended that Toyota
could not claim goodwill in respect of use of the mark PRIUS for cars
in India.163
Relying on a decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in Starbucks
vs. British Sky Broadcasting164 the Supreme Court endorsed the
findings that “ . . . no trader can complain of passing-off as against
him in any territory . . . in which he has no customers, nobody who is
158

Milmet Oftho Industries and Ors. Vs. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. M/S Prius Auto Industries Limited, Civil Appeal
No. 5375-5377 of 2017 [hereinafter Toyota Jidosha].
160 Id.
161 See Katherine Lyon Dayton, India: Supreme Court Applies Territoriality Principle
and Eviscerates Toyota’s Prius Victory, MONDAQ (last updated Apr. 13, 2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/691640/Trademark/Supreme+Court+Applies+Territorialit
y+Principle+And+Eviscerates+Toyotas+Prius+Victory
[https://perma.cc/Y9HE-LZJV]
(describing the Supreme Court of Delhi’s adoption of the “Territoriality Principle”).
162 Toyota Jidosha, at ¶ 5–6.
163 Toyota Jidosha, at ¶¶ 4–10.
164 See generally Starbucks (HK) Ltd and another v. British Sky Broadcasting Group
plc and others, [2015] UKSC 31, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2013-0274.html
[https://perma.cc/NH77-VU5L].
159
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in trade relation with him.” The Supreme Court of India noted that,
“the overwhelming judicial and academic opinion all over the globe
seemed to be in favor of the territoriality principle,” which requires
the court “to determine if there has been any spill-over reputation and
goodwill associated with the mark of the claimant.”165 The court
added that Toyota’s delay in initiating an action against a defendant
cannot be allowed to prejudice the defendant, who continuously used
the registered mark to market its goods during the inordinately long
period of silence maintained by the plaintiff.166 The decision of the
Indian Supreme court also indirectly will ensure prompt introduction
of such products within India. 167
It is important to note that India continues to undergo changes
after the Prius decision with reference to this area of law. There is no
evidence that ITC decision of the United States was the only reason
contributing to this changed thinking in India. But, the ITC decision
was widely circulated in India and generally perceived as the US
imposing a rule that is does not follow locally on India through the
USTR’s process.168 Perhaps, the ITC decision was an influencer—
perhaps it was not. Either way, the Indian Supreme Court decision is
commendable for carefully weighing traditional trademark principles
such as territoriality & priority in the context of protection for famous
foreign trademarks.

CONCLUSION
The lesson here is for both India and the United States. As far
as the United States is concerned, the bottom line is, the treatment
meted out for famous foreign trademarks in the United States does
not comport with what the United States expects when foreign marks
are adopted by third party prior users in other countries. Considering
165

Toyota Jidosha, at ¶¶ 28–29 (citing that a Hong Kong company had no trademark
protection claim for use of the mark in the UK).
166 See Shamnad Basheer, Toyota Loses Trademark Battle over Prius at Indian Supreme
Court, SPICYIP (Dec. 15, 2017), https://spicyip.com/2017/12/breaking-news-passing-off-byprius-reputation-must-be-proved-rules-indian-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/SLJ7QSFT] (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s decision to view “IP rights [as] ‘territorial’
and not ‘global’”).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Dhananjay Mahapatra, ITC Loses Bhukara Case in the US, TIMES OF INDIA
(Aug. 3, 2007, 3:03 AM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/ITCloses-Bukhara-copyright-case-in-US/articleshow/2251999.cms
[https://perma.cc/966VC8HA] (describing the ruling and reactions to it).

368

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 14

that the United States expects other nations to protect famous
American trademarks and that the office of the USTR specifically
cites countries that refuse to afford reciprocal protection to famous
foreign marks, it is imperative that the United States adopts a line of
jurisprudence it preaches to other countries. By not recognizing
famous foreign marks, American courts actively encourage what in
other countries (and if perpetrated by foreigners) would be termed as
“unfair business practices” when perpetrated by Americans. In
essence, the effect of the decision from the United States is that
Americans can steal, misappropriate and use famous foreign marks
so long as they manage to register such marks first within the US and
continue to use it. But, if the same scenario occurs abroad, the United
States decries it and terms it as “unfair trade.”
As far as India is concerned, there is no need to recognize
every foreign mark as famous just because it is “foreign.” There are
plenty of marks that are in use within the United States that may not
qualify as famous under the Trademarks Dilution statute of the United
States. In any case, it is arguable that Indians who travel abroad or
use the internet alone as a class represent the Indian market. That
said, India’s read of these cases has shown a strong trajectory towards
weighing in traditional principles of territoriality, use, priority into
the framework for recognition of well-known trademarks and that is
commendable.
Overall, in a globalized world, where the US has a belligerent
trade posture in trade as it does currently, it may not be long before
other countries learn extend the exact same treatment to American
famous trademarks. In any case, it is clear from the ITC v. Punchgini
decision that “an absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark
exception could promote consumer confusion and fraud.”169

169

See Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a famous mark exception exists against the territoriality principle).

